There has been a lot of discussion in the media recently about the quality of the intelligence used to support the war against Iraq. Why is this important? The war is over and most people thought it was a good idea or at least the results of the war were positive. Why go back and revisit issues that were discussed six months ago?

Because democratic processes are subverted when intelligence is manipulated to affect decisions by elected officials and the public. The doctrine of preemptive war “requires the public to base its support or opposition on expert intelligence to which it has no direct access. It is up to the president and his administration--with a deep interest in a given policy outcome--nonetheless to portray the intelligence community's findings honestly. If an administration represents the intelligence unfairly, it effectively forecloses an informed choice about the most important question a nation faces: whether or not to go to war.” The New Republic, "The First Casualty", June 30, 2003

In a Washington DC based blog, talkingpointsmemo.com Joshua Micah Marshall dissects the debate about the bogus African uranium claims President Bush used in his 2003 State of the Union speech. The most interesting part of his reports is how the information got into the speech in the first place and why it did not make it into Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations a week later. What is interesting about the story is what it reveals about the Bush Administration’s manipulation of intelligence information that it knew to be false in order to sell a war to the American people.

Yesterday, Condoleeza Rice laid the blame on George Tenet, director of the CIA, for failing to take the information out of the speech. It is apparent once one looks at what happened in January 2003 that George Tenet is getting the blame for an entire process that was controlled by the White House.

When White House staffers were drafting the speech in January, they found some information floating about Iraq seeking 500 pounds of yellowcake uranium in the central African country of Niger. The CIA had known for months that the information was probably false. It is unclear who was the original source of the report, but it made it into both American and British intelligence reports.

During the drafting of the speech, the CIA had objected to the use of the information to support Bush’s claims, citing its unreliability. But the Bush administration wanted to keep it in. According to Colin Powell, they decided that “such a statement was not totally outrageous or not to be believed or not to be appropriately used.” talkingpointsmemo.com, July 11th, 2003 -- 12:56 PM EDT This seems to be a fairly low standard of truthfulness with which to judge evidence supporting the case for war.

The CIA objected anyway, but George Tenet finally agreed to allow the statement to be used so long as it did not have any specific information regarding how much uranium and where it was sought and so long as the statement was attributed to the British. Tenet, in a statement accepting responsibility for the fiasco, said that the CIA agreed to the final wording because “the text in the speech was factually correct that the British government report said that Iraq sought uranium from Africa.” Associated Press, 7/11/2003 18:29, reported in Boston.com

This rationalization is legalistic hair-splitting on the level of Bill Clinton saying it depends on what the definition of the word ‘is’ is. It is true that the statement “the British government report said that Iraq sought uranium from Africa” is factually correct standing alone. But a statement presented as evidence to support a proposition must be more than just factually correct. The test of truth of a statement relies on the context in which it is made. In this case, the statement was not presented to support the contention that the British said something, but that Iraq sought uranium from Africa. If the statement were used to support an argument that British intelligence was unreliable, then the statement could be accepted as true in that context. But it was not. It was used to support an argument that Iraq was actively working on its nuclear program. In this context, the statement is not true and those who argued for and approved its use should have known this.

In his statement, Tenet agreed that whether the statement was factually correct “should not have been the test for clearing a presidential address. This did not rise to the level of certainty which should be required for presidential speeches, and CIA should have ensured that it was removed.” Associated Press, 7/11/2003 18:29, reported in Boston.com

Ya got that right. My question is why the information was included in the first place. The speechwriters and many in the White House knew the information was bogus. According to NPR reporter Tom Gjelten, it was White House staffers who suggested that the claim be attributed to the British. If the story is true, then it is clear that the White House wanted to get the information into the speech, no matter whether it was true or not. The Hill, "A Rose is a Rose is as Rose", June 25, 2003

Colin Powell seemed to have some knowledge of the bogus nature of the information. In fact, it is widely reported he used a “famous barnyard epithet” to describe it. Upon reading the first draft of his speech to the UN, Powell was so upset at the weakness of some of the evidence that he lost his temper, throwing several pages in the air and declaring, "I'm not reading this. This is bullshit." US News and World Report, "Truth and Consequences", June 9, 2003

Vice President Dick Cheney knew the information was bogus, but his office included it in the first draft of Powell’s speech to the UN anyway, only days after the CIA judged the information to be inaccurate. Cheney sent Ambassador Joe Wilson to Niger in February 2002, a year before the State of the Union address, to determine whether Iraq was trying to purchase uranium materials there. Wilson's report went into great detail about how the uranium ore was processed, how the processing was regulated, and most particularly who had physical custody of the product from the time it was in the ground to the time it was delivered to the customer. Wilson adduced various findings relating to the custody, oversight and regulation of the state uranium mining industry which, in his view, made the alleged sale highly unlikely. Wilson concluded in a recent New York Times Op-Ed that "I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat." talkingpointsmemo.com, July 12th, 2003 -- 11:53 AM EDT

It is clear that the White House knew the information was bogus and kept it in the State of the Union anyway. It was so important to keep in the State of the Union speech because there was no other information available to support the contention that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear capability. In January 2002 the CIA reported on global weapons-technology proliferation, but did not mention a nuclear threat from Iraq. The review said only, "We believe that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical R&D [research and development] associated with its nuclear program." In addition, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) “never assessed that there was good evidence that Iraq was reconstituting or getting really serious about its nuclear weapons program." The New Republic "The First Casualty", June 30, 2003

Yet it was important to the White House to keep the evidence of Iraq’s nuclear proliferation in the State of the Union speech because the Bush administration had decided to go to war and needed to rally the American people behind its plans. A famous propaganda tactic to get people to support a war is to scare them into believing they are being attacked. Herman Goering said at the Nuremberg trials that "the people don't want war. But after all, it's the leaders of the country who determine the policy, and it's always a simple matter to drag the people along whether it's a democracy, a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism, and exposing the country to greater danger." For those of us who opposed the war in January through March of this year, Goering’s quote sounds uncomfortably real.