B) Iraq: Misleading a Nation to War

In the build-up to your invasion of Iraq, we can see so many examples of this same sort of strategy that it's nearly impossible to even catalog them all. But since we were talking about science, let's just start there.

Many citizens and, especially, Senators have indicated that the potential threat of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program was the most significant factor in their reluctant support for the "preemptive" invasion of Iraq. So what evidence did you offer of that nuclear program to convince the American people of the threat?

The single most persuasive piece of evidence you offered at the time was the purchase by Iraq of some unique aluminum tubes. You explained to us that these tubes were secured by Iraq to use for centrifuges in their nuclear weapons program. However, as we have since learned, there was actually a substantial debate among government experts as to what these tubes were really for. There were CIA analysts who believed the tubes were for centrifuges. However, there were also experts at the Energy Department, in fact the most knowledgeable experts in the country, who believed the tubes were unsuited for centrifuges, but rather, were likely for combustion chambers for slim rockets fired from launcher pods. In fact, the International Atomic Energy Agency had examined tubes of identical specifications in Iraq in 1996 that were actually being used as conventional rocket launchers. Based on their analysis, "the Energy Department experts ... concluded that using the tubes in centrifuges 'is credible but unlikely, and a rocket production is the much more likely end use for these tubes.' "Yes, it was theoretically possible [to use the tubes for centrifuges], but as an Energy Department analyst later told Senate investigators, it was also theoretically possible to 'turn your new Yugo into a Cadillac.''' Similar conclusions were being reached by Britain's intelligence service and experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations body."

Now this point was very important to your case for an Iraqi threat that would justify an invasion. It was clear to you and everyone else that support for the war was reluctant and that you would have to have a viable and convincing case to get support from Congress and the American People. Furthermore, as Dr. David A. Kay, the chief American arms inspector after the war said, "remember ... the tubes were the only piece of physical evidence about the Iraqi weapons programs that [you] had.''

Now this sounds a lot like some of the scientific issues we looked at before. You have a specific agenda, and the science does not really back up your agenda. So what do you do? Well you ignore, or even bury the science that doesn't support you, of course, and focus only on those opinions that bolster your position.

So, more than a year after the department of Energy started telling your administration that it was unlikely these tubes were for a nuclear program, you stood before the U.N. and said Iraq had made "several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon." Now I can see how you might have still thought this was a debatable issue. But you didn't say that. You just said it was true, even though the best science at the time said otherwise. In other words you selectively chose to go with science that you wanted to be true, rather that being honest about finding out what was actually true.

What Condoleeza Rice said, though is even more deceptive. A few days before you spoke to the U.N., she actually said, "We do know that there have been shipments going into iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to ... high quality aluminum tubes that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs; centrifuge programs. We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud. " -Condoleeza Rice, US National Security Advisor, September 2002

It's hard to even believe that! She actually said these tubes were "only really suited for ... centrifuge programs." Even though the Energy Department experts; the best experts in the country, had been saying for over a year that the tubes were not suited for centrifuges, but were well suited for conventional rocket launchers! Still she said otherwise.

Of course, this is not just a matter of opinion ... as to which theory was better. It's not a subjective matter like which are better ... peas or carrots? that's a matter of taste. The question of the aluminum tubes is much more objective than that. Now, of course, we know that those tubes were NOT for a nuclear program, never were, and in fact, Iraq had had no nuclear program for over ten years. Indeed, the tubes were for conventional rocket launchers, just like they said.

That's the problem when you disregard, ignore, or bury to best evidence, of course, ... is that you're unlikely to have your view born out when the facts come in. Now even the best scientific theories may be disproven, but you're really on thin ice when you just try to ignore the evidence and make up what you want.

Again, remember what those scientists were saying. We may or may not agree as to the ultimate policy choices, but that's not even what we're talking about. This is about refusing to even enter into an honest debate ... or to be truthful or accurate in your representation of information. If you had wanted to be honest, you would have thoroughly investigated and apprised yourself of the various theories on these aluminum tubes, then told the public "there is some debate about what these tubes are for." You could have said, "some believe they are for (permissible) conventional rocket launchers, but others fear they may indicate an ongoing nuclear program." You could even have said, "we don't feel like we can take the chance that they might be part of a nuclear weapons program, and believe we must err on the safe side." Now all that would have been truthful and honest. Then the American people would have had accurate information and perspective on which to base our opinions, as would the Congress. But that's not what happened. Instead you chose to present a one sided distortion of the information, because you feared that a truthful disclosure would have weakened the case you wanted to make.

But the American people deserve more respect than this. We are not stupid. We are perfectly capable of "handling truth" ... even when it's a little complicated. It's not your job to pursue your own agenda, and release information only as it will mold our opinions in support of that agenda. No! It's your responsibility to be straight with us ... to lead us, not to lie to us. Misleading is not the same as leading. When others see the wisdom in your approach to problems and circumstances, and come to trust you and follow you with confidence, you are "leading." When you misrepresent the problems and circumstances to convince others of the wisdom of your approach, you are not leading but "misleading." In this way you have indeed proven yourself a great national misleader.

Now that we've got many more facts, and we've learned that those aluminum tubes were not for centrifuges or any nuclear program at all, now that we've gone ahead and invaded a sovereign nation and started a war that has cost over 10,000 lives based on misinformation, now Condoleeza is backtracking. Now, regarding her earlier statement, she says, ""The intelligence community assessment as a whole was that these were likely, and certainly suitable for and likely for his nuclear weapons program." - From ABC's This Week - 10/3/04. Now even this is debatable ... considering the Energy Department analysts, some of whom had been building and working on centrifuges for decades, were clearly indicating to the contrary. But, even if we give the benefit of the doubt, and say Condi weighed all the opinions and analysis, and came to buy into the centrifuge theory as the most credible, that's still a long way from saying the tubes are "only really suited" to nuclear weapons programs. Either she was "telling tales" or she didn't know what the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Energy Department knew.

And this brings me to another, larger point. Frankly, I don't care a whole lot whether Condoleeza Rice was outright lying, was creatively deceiving by half-truths and ommission, or was actually completely in the dark. I mean, she is the National Security Advisor for Pete's sake! It's her job to know these things. If she's going to go on National Television and tell the American people that Iraq is buying aluminum tubes that are "only suitable" for development of nuclear weapons, then surely she has the responsibility to check the story out first. That doesn't just mean asking the first person who will say what she or the President wants him to say. That means actually asking questions, hearing dissent, digging under the surface, and challenging the analysis she receives. The excuse of "bad intelligence" just doesn't fly here. It wasn't bad intelligence at all, it was a question of the analysis of perfectly good intelligence (in fact we had actually captured a shipment of the aluminum tubes and had the opportunity to study them extensively).

I mean this was not a small issue. This was, perhaps, the single most important issue of "National Security" at the time. This analysis was to be the central justification for an unprecedented unprovoked invasion of another sovereign nation. It was the basis for estimating whether an declared enemy might have nuclear capabilities. You'd think that she could actually check it out ... thoroughly! You'd also hope that she would represent it truthfully to the American people.

But as far as I can tell, one of three things happened here ... either:

1) Condoleeza Rice understood the debate between the CIA analysis and the Energy Department Analysis and willfully and blatantly misrepresented the information to the American people or

2) She assessed the analysis by the Energy Department to be so unlikely that it was not even worth considering (in spite of the facts that it was proffered by the leading experts in the field, and that this analysis is the one that was actually most accurate), or

2) The National Security Advisor was oblivious to vital and pivotal information on the most important issue of National Security facing the country, in spite of the efforts of those trying to communicate that information to her.

I'm not sure which of these is more frightening.

If she lied outright, then we must remove her immediately, as anyone that would so boldly lie to the nation about such a grave and monumental concern certainly cannot be trusted as a servant of the people.

If she assessed the most accurate analysis of this vital issue, as well as the opinions of the most expert analysts, and assessed them to be inconsequential, then her judgment is so horrible and lacking, then she certainly cannot be trusted with our national security, and she must be removed.

If she was oblivious to the most relevant analysis of this most vital situation, then she is utterly irresponsible and incompetent to protect our national security, and must be removed.

This is a conclusion I come to often when trying to understand how this situation, and this war developed. I feel like the administration is playing a shell game with us ... and it can be a very effective distraction, until I realize that ALL THE SHELLS ARE EMPTY!


_______________

I should mention that you actually gave two pieces of "supporting evidence" for Saddam's nuclear program. The other clue was the uranium Iraq supposedly tried to buy from Niger. Of course this story has been completely debunked even more emphatically than the lies about the aluminum tubes ... to the point where the CIA was actually telling you this story was make believe - and you included it in the state of the union anyway!!! ... but i think that's been examined and exposed enough.

(check out: NY Times
July 6, 2003
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

What I Didn't Find in Africa
By JOSEPH C. WILSON 4th

Ultimately, what is most important is that you convinced enough people to believe in a non-existent Iraqi nuclear program to get the support you wanted ... and that's what you were after. As usual, the actual truth of the situation just didn't seems to matter.


More War Stories

In the last several months, reports from two very important investigations have been completed, and released. The first was the report from the 9/11 Commission (Officially the "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States"), and the second was the Duelfer Report, released in early October.

The 9/11 Commission, "an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and the signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002, is chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The Commission is also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks." It's process and results have been widely praised as a triumph of genuine inquiry and non-partisan cooperation, and the commission released it's unanimous report in July of 2004.

The Duelfer Report is the culmination of approximately 17 months of investigation led by Charles Duelfer, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq. Duelfer was appointed by the President to complete the U.S. investigation of Iraq's weapons programs, and this "investigation represents the government's most definitive accounting of Hussein's weapons programs, the assumed strength of which the Bush administration presented as a central reason for the war," according to the Washington Post (U.S. 'Almost All Wrong' on Weapons, Thursday, October 7, 2004; Page A01.)

The report had many striking conclusions. It said, for instance, that Saddam Hussein was extremely focused on getting the international sanctions that had saddled Iraq since 1991 lifted. To that end, the report paints a picture of back room wheeling, dealing, and influence peddling with a network of businesses and nations around the world to illegally bypass the sanctions, secure banned goods, and also to get the sanctions officially softened. It also indicated that Hussein still had a strong wish and intent to restart at least some of his WMD programs if the sanctions were lifted, and that this was a major motivation for his wanting to get out from under the sanctions.

On the other hand, The Duelfer Report concluded that within a couple years of the first Gulf war (1991), Iraq has dismantled most or all of its WMD ("Weapons of Mass Destruction") programs. By the time the U.S invaded Iraq, stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons were destroyed and there were no mechanisms in place to rebuild or restock them. There had been no nuclear weapons program for some years, and there were no specific plans to restart one. Apparently, the sanctions that had been in place since 1991 were effective in shutting down Hussein's WMD programs, while also crippling Iraq's economy.

Meanwhile, (a few months earlier) - the 9/11 Commission Report had also had some significant findings. Here is an Excerpt:

Bin Ladin also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime. Bin Ladin had in fact at one time sponsored anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded bin Ladin to cease this support and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. A senior Iraqi Intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting bin Ladin in 1994. Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded. There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Ladin had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship. Two senior bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United


They way I read it, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Osama Bin Ladin was living first in Sudan then in Aghanistan when he had contact with Iraqi officials. For a while Bin Ladin was actually helping out some forces opposing Saddam, presumably because Bin Ladin fundamentally opposes secular regimes, but Sudan convinced him to cut that out. At some later point officials from Sudan set Bin Ladin up to meet with Iraqis, and they met once. Bin Ladin asked them for some favors, and they didn't respond, and they didn't call him back. Later, there are some reports of contact between Iraq and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but it's not clear what those were about. However, the Commission's summary of this line of evidence is that there's nothing to show that al Qaeda and Iraq ever had a cooperative relationship.

Of course the 9/11 Commission is an extensive report, dealing with many many subjects and issues, and this examination of the ties between Iraq and Bin Ladin is but a small fraction of the very grand whole. However, I am highlighting this area because my focus is on the lack of veracity, integrity, and competence we find in the statements and manners of the Bush Administration as they tried to sell the war against Iraq.

So what I'm seeing here is that these two reports are looking hard at all the evidence they can find, including both what the administration knew when and before they invaded Iraq, as well as much more that has come to light or been clarified since. Of course it is only natural to compare what we've learned with the representations the Administration made when they were in sole control of the intelligence.

Needless to say, I, personally, see a great chasm between the evidence we have now and the legitimacy of the representations by the Administration. It seems to me that the Bush Adminstration approached this policy as it approaches most policies. They had an agenda or a plan already, and they set about to shape the perceptions of the facts to support their agenda. Well of course ... that's part of democracy. Everyone tries to appeal to others' perceptions of facts.

However, if you are in control of nearly all the intelligence, and you are unscrupulous, then you can do a lot more than just "shape the perceptions of the facts." You can actually change the facts ... and get away with it. It only takes very subtle changes in detail to have huge impacts on perceptions. As outlined previously, the Bush Administration has consistently shown themselves more than willing to bend, change, distort, and suppress relevant information in the service of their own ends.

So when they wanted to sell us the war, they took what information they had and bent and exaggerated and omitted as necessary to make their case. At the time many many many many people believed, and said (and screamed) that the Administration's cast was lying. Since then, I have seen much to reinforce that belief, but almost nothing to diminish it.

Once more I must say that if they had been truthful and candid ... if they had adequately questioned one sided intelligence and reported to us as accurately as they could ... and they had still garnered sufficient support to go to war, then I might have still oppose the war as a policy choice, but I could still have respected the process ... that's democracy. But that's not what happened.


Here's an exercise that I'm hardly the first to do, ... but it's interesting ...

... talk talk talk ...